MIMO Multiple Access Channel with an Arbitrarily Varying Eavesdropper by He, Xiang et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
20
3.
13
76
v1
  [
cs
.IT
]  
7 M
ar 
20
12
1
MIMO Multiple Access Channel with an Arbitrarily
Varying Eavesdropper
Xiang He, Ashish Khisti∗, Aylin Yener†
∗Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, M5S 3G4, Canada
† Electrical Engineering Department, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802
xianghe@microsoft.com, akhisti@comm.utoronto.ca, yener@psu.edu
Abstract—A two-transmitter Gaussian multiple access wiretap
channel with multiple antennas at each of the nodes is investi-
gated. The channel matrices at the legitimate terminals are fixed
and revealed to all the terminals, whereas the channel matrix
of the eavesdropper is arbitrarily varying and only known to
the eavesdropper. The secrecy degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) region
under a strong secrecy constraint is characterized. A transmission
scheme that orthogonalizes the transmit signals of the two users
at the intended receiver and uses a single-user wiretap code
is shown to be sufficient to achieve the s.d.o.f. region. The
converse involves establishing an upper bound on a weighted-
sum-rate expression. This is accomplished by using induction,
where at each step one combines the secrecy and multiple-
access constraints associated with an adversary eavesdropping
a carefully selected group of sub-channels.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information theoretic security was first introduced by Shan-
non in [1], which studied the problem of transmitting confi-
dential information in a communication system in the presence
of an eavesdropper with unbounded computational power.
Since then, an extensive body of work has been devoted to
studying this problem for different network models by deriving
fundamental transmission rate limits [2]–[4] and designing
low-complexity schemes to approach these limits in practice
[5], [6].
Secure communication using multiple antennas was ex-
tensively studied as well, see e.g., [7]–[15]. These works
investigated efficient signaling mechanisms using the spatial
degrees of freedom provided by multiple antennas to limit
an eavesdropper’s ability to decode information. The underly-
ing information theoretic problem, the multi-antenna wiretap
channel, was studied and the associated secrecy capacity
was identified. We note that these works assumed that the
eavesdropper’s channel state information is available either
completely or partially, although such an assumption may not
be justified in practice.
As a more pessimistic but stronger assumption, references
[16]–[18] study secrecy capacity when the eavesdropper chan-
nel is arbitrarily varying and its channel states are known to
the eavesdropper only. Reference [17] studies the single-user
Gaussian multi-input-multi-output (MIMO) wiretap channel
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and characterizes the secrecy degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.). The
same paper extended the single user analysis to the two user
Gaussian MIMO multiple access (MIMO-MAC) channel. This
was possible only when all the legitimate terminals have equal
number of antennas, leaving the MIMO-MAC with arbitrary
number of antennas at the terminals an open problem.
Our main contribution is to fully characterize the s.d.o.f.
region of the two-transmitter MIMO MAC channel when the
eavesdropper channel is arbitrarily varying. We show that the
s.d.o.f. region can be achieved by a scheme that orthogonalizes
the transmit signals of the two users at the intended receiver.
Moreover, it suffices to use a single-user wiretap channel
code [17] and no coordination between the users is necessary
except for synchronization and sharing the transmit dimen-
sions. To establish the optimality of this scheme, our converse
proof decomposes the MIMO MAC channel into a set of par-
allel and independent channels using the generalized singular
value decomposition (GSVD). A set of eavesdroppers, each
monitoring a subset of links, is selected using an induction
procedure and the resulting secrecy constraints are combined
to obtain an upper bound on a weighted sum-rate expression.
The outer bound matches the achievable rate in terms of the
s.d.o.f. region, thus settling the open problem raised in [17]
for the case of two transmitters.
Interestingly, the s.d.o.f. region remains open for this model
when the eavesdropper channel is perfectly known to all
terminals. A significant body of literature already exists on
this problem, see e.g., [19]–[22]. If the channel model has real
inputs and outputs, Gaussian signaling is in general suboptimal
and user cooperating strategies as well as signal alignment
techniques are necessary [23]. In [24] it is established that
s.d.o.f. of 1/2 is achievable using real interference alignment
for almost all configurations of channel gains. If the channel
model has complex inputs and outputs, it is shown in [25,
Section 5.16] that in general s.d.o.f. of 1/2 is achievable using
asymmetric Gaussian signaling. In contrast, the best known
upper bound on the s.d.o.f. of individual rates is 2/3 for both
cases, established in [25, Section 5.5].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe the system model. The main result is
stated as Theorem 1 in Section IV. The proof of the theorem is
divided into two parts. First, we establish the result for the case
of parallel channels in Section V. Subsequently, in Section VI
we establish the result for the general case by decomposing
the MIMO-MAC channel into a set of independent parallel
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Fig. 1. The MIMO MAC wiretap channel where NT1 = NT2 = 2, NR = 3,
NE = 1.
channels. Such a reduction is used both in the proof of the
converse as well as the coding scheme. Section VII concludes
the paper.
We use the following notation throughout the paper: For
a set A, Vi,A and VA denote the set of random variables
{Vi,j , j ∈ A} and {Vj , j ∈ A} respectively. {δn} denotes a
non-negative sequence of n that converges to 0 when n goes to
∞. We use bold upper-case font for matrices and vectors and
lower-case font for scalars. The distinction between matrices
and vectors will be clear from the context. For a set A, |A|
denotes its cardinality and a short hand notation xn is used
for the sequence {x1, x2, . . . , xn}. φ denotes the empty set.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Figure 1, we consider a discrete-time channel
model where two transmitters communicate with one receiver
in the presence of an eavesdropper. We assume transmitter i
has NTi antennas, i = 1, 2, the legitimate receiver has NR
antennas whereas the eavesdropper has NE antennas. The
channel model is given by
Y(i) =
2∑
k=1
HkXk(i) + Z(i) (1)
Y˜(i) =
2∑
k=1
H˜k(i)Xk(i) (2)
where i ∈ {1, . . . , n} denotes the time-index, Hk, k = 1, 2,
are channel matrices and Z is the additive Gaussian noise
observed by the intended receiver, which is composed of
independent rotationally invariant complex Gaussian random
variables with zero mean and unit variance. The sequence
of eavesdropper channel matrices {H˜k(i), k = 1, 2}, is an
arbitrary sequence of length n and only revealed to the
eavesdropper. In contrast,Hk, k = 1, 2 are revealed to both the
legitimate parties and the eavesdropper(s). We assume NE , the
number of eavesdropper antennas, is known to the legitimate
parties and the eavesdropper.
User k, k = 1, 2, wishes to transmit a confidential message
Wk, k = 1, 2, to the receiver over n channel uses, while
both messages, W1 and W2, must be kept confidential from
the eavesdropper. We use γ to index a specific sequence
of {H˜k(i), k = 1, 2} over n channel uses and use Y˜nγ to
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Fig. 2. (a) A special case of MIMO MAC wiretap channel where NT1 =
NT2 = 2, NR = 3, NE = 1, (b) Comparison between achievable s.d.o.f.
region and a simple outer bound derived by considering one eavesdropper at
a time.
represent the corresponding channel outputs for Y˜n. The
strong secrecy constraint is [17]:
lim
n→∞
I
(
W1,W2; Y˜
n
γ
)
= 0, ∀γ (3)
where the convergence must be uniform over γ. The average
power constraints for the two users are given by
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
|Xk(i)|
2 ≤ P¯k, k = 1, 2. (4)
The secrecy rate for user k, Rs,k, is defined as
Rs,k = lim
n→∞
1
n
H(Wk), k = 1, 2. (5)
such that Wk can be reliably decoded by the receiver, and (3)
and (4) are satisfied.
We define the secrecy degrees of freedom as:{
(d1, d2) : dk = lim sup
P¯1=P¯2=P¯→∞
Rs,k
log2 P¯
, k = 1, 2
}
(6)
III. MOTIVATION
Before stating the main result, we illustrate the main dif-
ficulty in characterizing the s.d.o.f. region through a simple
example. As illustrated in Figure 2(a), in this example, each
transmitter has 2 antennas and the intended receiver has 3
antennas, while the eavesdropper has only 1 antenna. Let
x1, x2, x3, x4 denote the transmitted signals from the two users
and y1, y2, y3 denote the signals observed by the intended the
receiver. And the main channel is given by
y1 = x1 + z1, y3 = x4 + z3 (7)
y2 = x2 + x3 + z2 (8)
where zi, i = 1, 2, 3 denote additive channel noise. As shown
in [17], a secrecy degree of freedom min(NTk , NR)−NE =
1 is achievable for a user if the other user remains silent.
Time sharing between these two users lead to the following
achievable s.d.o.f. region:
d1 + d2 ≤ 1, dk ≥ 0, k = 1, 2 (9)
For the converse, we begin by considering a simple upper
bound, which reduces each channel to a single-user MIMO
wiretap channel. First, by revealing the signals transmitted
by user 2 to the intended receiver and assuming that the
eavesdropper monitors either x1 or x2 we have that d1 ≤ 1.
3Similarly we argue that d2 ≤ 1. To obtain an upper bound
on the sum-rate we let the two transmitters to cooperate and
reduce the system to a 3× 3 MIMO link. The s.d.o.f. of this
channel [17] yields d1 + d2 ≤ 2. This outer bound, illustrated
in Figure 2(b), does not match with the achievable region given
by (9).
As we shall show in Theorem 1, (9) is indeed the s.d.o.f.
capacity region and hence a new converse is necessary to prove
this result. Our key observation is that the above upper bound
only considers one eavesdropper at a time in deriving each
of the three bounds. For example, when deriving d1 ≤ 1, we
assume there is only one eavesdropper which is monitoring
either x1 or x2. When deriving d2 ≤ 1, we assume there is
only one eavesdropper which is monitoring either x3 or x4.
Similarly when deriving d1 + d2 ≤ 2 we again assume that
there is one eavesdropper on either of the links. As we shall
discuss below, a tighter upper bound is possible to find if we
consider the simultaneous effect of two eavesdroppers.
In our system model, there are infinitely many possible
eavesdroppers, each corresponding to a different channel state
sequence. The challenge is to find out a finite number of
eavesdroppers, whose joint effect leads to a tight converse. Our
choice of eavesdroppers is based on the following intuition:
When an eavesdropper chooses which links to monitor, it
should give precedence to those links over which only one
user can transmit. This is because these links are the major
contributor to the sum s.d.o.f. d1+d2 since they are dedicated
links to a certain user. Based on this intuition, we consider the
following two eavesdroppers: one monitors y1 for W1 and the
other monitors y3 for W2. As we shall show later in Lemma 1,
the first eavesdropper implies the following upper bound on
R1:
n(R1 − δn) ≤ I
(
xn2 ; y
n
2 |y
n
1 , x
n
{3,4}
)
(10)
and the second eavesdropper implies the following upper
bound on R2:
n(R2 − δn) ≤ I
(
yn1 , x
n
{3,4}; y
n
2
)
(11)
Their joint effect can be captured by adding (10) and (11)
[26], which lead to:
n(R1 +R2 − 2δn) ≤ I
(
xn2 , y
n
1 , x
n
{3,4}; y
n
2
)
(12)
Since there is only one term, which is yn2 , at the right side
of the mutual information I
(
xn2 , y
n
1 , x
n
{3,4}; y
n
2
)
, we observe
the sum s.d.o.f. can not exceed 1, thereby justifying that (9)
is indeed the largest possible s.d.o.f. region for Figure 2(a).
As captured by (10) and (11), a simultaneous selection
of two different eavesdroppers for the two users reduces the
effective signal dimension at the receiver from three to one,
thus leading to a tighter converse. As we shall show later in
Section V-C, in generalizing this example we are required to
systematically select a sequence of eavesdroppers using an
induction procedure.
IV. MAIN RESULT
In this section, we state the main result of this work. To
express our result, we define rt as the rank of Ht, t = 1, 2
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Fig. 3. The secrecy degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) region in Theorem 1: (a)
0 ≤ NE ≤ min{r0 − r1, r0 − r2}, (b) min{r0 − r1, r0 − r2} ≤ NE ≤
max{r0 − r1, r0 − r2}, (c) max{r0 − r1, r0 − r2} ≤ NE
and r0 as the rank of [ H1 | H2 ]. We will refer to rt as the
number of transmit dimensions at user t = 1, 2 and r0 as the
number of dimensions at the receiver.
Theorem 1: The secrecy degrees of freedom region of the
MIMO multiple access channel with arbitrarily varying eaves-
dropper channel is given by the convex hull of the following
five points of (d1, d2):
p0 = (0, 0) (13)
p1 =
(
[r1 −NE ]
+
, 0
)
(14)
p2 =
(
0, [r2 −NE]
+
)
(15)
p3 =
(
[r1 −NE ]
+
, [r0 − r1 −NE ]
+
)
(16)
p4 =
(
[r0 − r2 −NE ]
+
, [r2 −NE ]
+
)
(17)
where we use [x]+ ∆= max{x, 0}.
Fig. 3 illustrates the structure of the s.d.o.f. region as a
function of the number of eavesdropping antennas. In Fig. 3 (a)
we have NE ≤ min(r0 − r1, r0 − r2). In this case the
s.d.o.f. region is a polymatroid (see e.g., [27, Definition 3.1])
described by di ≤ ri − NE and d1 + d2 ≤ r0 − 2NE .
Fig. 3 (b) illustrates the shape of the s.d.o.f. region when
min{r0 − r1, r0 − r2} ≤ NE ≤ max{r0 − r1, r0 − r2}. In
Fig. 3 (b), without loss of generality, we assume r1 < r2 and
the s.d.o.f. region is bounded by the lines di ≥ 0, d1 ≤ r1−NE
and
(r1 + r2 − r0)d1 + (r1 −NE)d2
≤ (r1 −NE)× (r2 −NE). (18)
When min(r1, r2) > NE ≥ max(r0− r1, r0− r2), the s.d.o.f.
region, as illustrated in Fig. 3 (c) is bounded by di ≥ 0 and
the line
d1
r1 −NE
+
d2
r2 −NE
≤ 1. (19)
The s.d.o.f. region in Theorem 1 allows the following
simple interpretation: The region can be expressed as a convex
hull of a set of rectangles shown by Figure 4 (illustrated
for Figure 3 (a)). Each rectangle is parameterized by the
dimensions of the subspace occupied by the transmission
signals from the two users, denoted by (t1, t2), where ti
indicates the dimension of user i, i = 1, 2. Then in order
for the signals from both transmitters to be received reliably
4(d1, d2)
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Fig. 4. Interpretation of the s.d.o.f. region as a convex hull of rectangles:
(d1, d2) : 0 ≤ di ≤ [ti−NE ]
+, i = 1, 2, where ti is the number of degrees
of freedom occupied by user i. To achieve reliable transmission, we must have
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Fig. 5. Definition of the set A,B, C, where |B| = 4.
by the receiver, we must have
t1 + t2 ≤ r0 (20)
0 ≤ ti ≤ ri, i = 1, 2 (21)
Each user then transmits confidential messages with 0 ≤ di ≤
[ti −NE]+ over the available ti dimensions, where the −NE
term is an effect of the secrecy constraint (3).
It is clear that p3, p4 given by (16) and (17) are in one of
these rectangles. Hence the convex hull of these rectangles
yields the s.d.o.f. region stated in Theorem 1.
V. PROOF FOR THE PARALLEL CHANNEL MODEL
In this section, we establish Theorem 1 for the case of
parallel channels. As illustrated in Fig. 5, the receiver observes
yi = x1i + zi, i ∈ A, (22)
yi = x1i + x2i + zi, i ∈ B, (23)
yi = x2i + zi, i ∈ C, (24)
where the noise random variables across the sub-channels are
independent and each is distributed according to CN (0, 1) and
{x1i}i∈A∪B and {x2i}i∈B∪C denote the transmit symbols of
user 1 and user 2 respectively.
The parallel channel model is a special case of (1) with
H1=

 I|A| I|B|
O|C|

, H2=

 O|A| I|B|
I|C|

,
(25)
where I|A|, I|B| and I|C| denote the identity matrices of size
|A|, |B| and |C| respectively, and O|A| and O|B| denote the
matrices, all of whose entries are zeros. Note that we do not
make any assumption on the eavesdropper’s channel model (2).
A. Achievability
It suffices to establish the achievability of points p3 and p4
in (16) and (17) respectively. The rest of the region follows
through time-sharing between these points. Note that for the
proposed parallel channel model
p3 =
(
[|A|+ |B| −NE]
+
, [|C| −NE ]
+
)
(26)
p4 =
(
[|A| −NE ]
+ , [|B|+ |C| −NE ]
+
)
(27)
To prove the achievability of p3 we restrict user 2 to transmit
only on the last |C| components of in (24) and allow user 1 to
transmit over all of the components of A∪B in (22) and (23).
Note that in this case, the signals of these two users do not
interfere with each other at the intended receiver. From [17],
user 1 can transmit W1 such that d1 = [|A|+ |B|−NE]+ and
lim
n→∞
I(W1; H˜
n
1X
n
1 ) = 0 (28)
and user 2 can transmit W2 such that d2 = [|C| −NE ]+ and
lim
n→∞
I(W2; H˜
n
2X
n
2 ) = 0 (29)
where we use H˜nkXnk to denote the sequence
{H˜k(i)Xk(i), i = 1, ..., n}. Furthermore since (W1,Xn1
is independent of (W2,Xn2 ) we have that
lim
n→∞
I(W1; H˜
n
1X
n
1 , H˜
n
2X
n
2 ) = 0 (30)
lim
n→∞
I(W2; H˜
n
1X
n
1 , H˜
n
2X
n
2 ) = 0 (31)
which imply:
I
(
W1; H˜
n
1X
n
1 , H˜
n
2X
n
2 |W2
)
≤I
(
W1;W2, H˜
n
1X
n
1 , H˜
n
2X
n
2
)
(32)
=I
(
W1; H˜
n
1X
n
1 , H˜
n
2X
n
2
)
+ I
(
W1;W2|H˜
n
1X
n
1 , H˜
n
2X
n
2
)
(33)
≤I
(
W1; H˜
n
1X
n
1 , H˜
n
2X
n
2
)
+ I
(
W1, H˜
n
1X
n
1 ;W2, H˜
n
2X
n
2
)
(34)
=I
(
W1; H˜
n
1X
n
1
)
(35)
where the last step follows from the fact that (W2, H˜n2Xn2 ) is
independent from (W1, H˜n1Xn1 ). Therefore (28) implies
lim
n→∞
I
(
W1; H˜
n
1X
n
1 , H˜
n
2X
n
2 |W2
)
= 0. (36)
5Adding (36) and (31), we obtain
lim
n→∞
I
(
W1,W2; H˜
n
1X
n
1 , H˜
n
2X
n
2
)
= 0 (37)
and the secrecy constraint (3) follows from the data-processing
inequality. Also, since the convergence in n in (30) and (31)
is uniform [17], the convergence in (37) and hence in (3)
is uniform as well. Hence we have proved the point p3 is
achievable.
The achievability of p4 is proved by repeating the argument
above by exchanging user 1 with user 2.
Remark 1: As is evident from (37), the secrecy guarantee
achieved by one user is not affected by the transmission
strategy of the other user.
B. Converse : NE ≤ min(|A|, |C|)
We need to show that the s.d.o.f. region is contained within
d1 ≤ |A|+ |B| −NE (38)
d2 ≤ |C|+ |B| −NE (39)
d1 + d2 ≤ |A|+ |B|+ |C| − 2NE (40)
Since (38) and (39) directly follow from the single user case
in [17], we only need to show (40).
Let Ek be the set of links such that an eavesdropper is
monitoring for Wk, k = 1, 2. |E1| = |E2| = NE . A ⊇ E1,
C ⊇ E2. We establish the following upper bound on the
achievable rate pairs.
Lemma 1:
n(Rs,1 − δn) ≤ I
(
Xn1,A\E1 ;Y
n
A\E1
)
+ I
(
Xn1,B;Y
n
B |M
)
(41)
n(Rs,2 − δn) ≤ I(X
n
2,C\E2
;Y nC\E2) + I (M ;Y
n
B ) (42)
where M =
(
Y n1,A, X
n
2,B∪C
)
.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A.
The proof is completed upon adding (41) and (42) so that
n(Rs,1 +Rs,2 − 2δn)
≤ (Xn1,A\E1 ;Y
n
1,A\E1
) + I(Xn2,C\E2 ;Y
n
2,C\E2
)
+ I(M,Xn1,B;Y
n
B ) (43)
and using
d
(
1
n
I(XnA\E1 ;Y
n
A\E1
)
)
≤ |A| −NE (44)
d
(
1
n
I(XnC\E2 ;Y
n
C\E2
)
)
≤ |C| −NE (45)
d
(
1
n
I(M,Xn1,B;Y
n
B )
)
≤ |B| (46)
where d(x) ∆= limP→∞ x(P )log2 P characterizes the pre-log scaling
of x with respect to P .
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Fig. 6. The set Fk , G, and Vk when |F| = 3, |G| = 7 and |B| = 8. (a)
Case I, i = 1, c1 = 1. (b) Case II, i = 4, H5 = {1}, F5 = {6, 7, 1},
V5 = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, c4 = 2, c5 = 3.
C. Converse : NE > max(|A|, |C|)
Without loss of generality, we assume |C| ≥ |A|. Let Ek be
the set of links such that an eavesdropper is monitoring for
Wk, k = 1, 2. Let |E1| = |E2| = NE , A ⊂ E1, and C ⊂ E2.
Define the set F ,G such that F = B\E1, G = B\E2. Since
|C| ≥ |A|, we have |G| ≥ |F|.
Then Theorem 1 reduces to dk ≥ 0, k = 1, 2 and
|G|d1 + |F|d2 ≤ |F| × |G| (47)
which we now show. We first introduce the following lemma:
Lemma 2: For any choice of F ⊆ B and G ⊆ B with
appropriate cardinalities the rates Rs,1 and Rs,2 are upper
bounded by
n(Rs,1 − δn) ≤ I
(
Xn1,F ;Y
n
F |M,X
n
1,B\F
)
(48)
n(Rs,2 − δn) ≤ I
(
M,Xn1,B\G ;Y
n
G
)
(49)
where M =
{
Y n1,A, X
n
2,B∪C
}
.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix B.
For the remainder of the proof we assume without
loss of generality that B = {1, . . . , |B|}. We fix G =
{1, . . . , |G|} while choosing |G| different sets of |F| elements:
F1, . . . ,F|G|, the sets V0, . . . ,V|G| and a sequence of ci in the
following recursive manner.
Definition 1: Let V0 = G, c0 = 1. For i ≥ 1 recursively
construct Fi as follows.
1) Case I: |Vi−1| ≥ |F|
Let Fi = {Vi−1(1), . . . ,Vi−1(|F |)}, where Vi−1(k)
denotes the kth smallest element in Vi−1. Let Vi =
Vi−1\Fi, and ci = ci−1. This case is illustrated in
Figure 6(a) for i = 1.
2) Case II: |Vi−1| < |F|
Let Fi = Vi−1 ∪ Hi, and Vi = G\Hi, and ci = ci−1 +
1, where Hi = {1, 2, . . . , |F| − |Vi−1|}. This case is
illustrated in Figure 6(b) for i = 4.
To interpret the above construction, we note that the set G
is a row-vector with |G| elements and let G⊗ be obtained by
concatenating |F| identical copies of the G vector i.e.,
G⊗ = [G | G | . . .G]︸ ︷︷ ︸
|F| copies
(50)
6As shown in Figure 6, by our construction, the vector F1 spans
the first |F| elements of G⊗, the vector F2 spans the next |F|
elements of G⊗ etc. The constant ci denotes the index number
of copies of the G vector necessary to cover Fi .
When i = |G| the row-vector Fi terminates exactly at the
end of the last G vector in G⊗. Hence,
c|G| = |F|, V|G| = φ. (51)
By going through the above recursive procedure and invok-
ing Lemma 2 repeatedly, each time by setting F in (48) and
(49) to be Fi, we establish the following upper bound on the
rate region.
Lemma 3: For each i = 0, 1, . . . , |G| and the set of channels
F1, F2, . . . ,F|G| defined in Def. 1, the rate pair (Rs,1, Rs,2)
satisfies the following upper bound
i · n(Rs,1 − δn) + ci · n(Rs,2 − δn)
≤
i∑
j=1
I(M,Xn1,B;Y
n
Fj ) + I(M,X
n
1,B\G ;Y
n
Vi). (52)
Before providing a proof, we note that (47) follows from (52)
as described below. Evaluating (52) with i = |G|, using (51)
and letting R˜s,i = Rs,i − δn,
n|G|R˜s,1 + n|F|R˜s,2 ≤
|G|∑
j=1
I(M,Xn1,B;Y
n
Fj) (53)
=
|G|∑
j=1
{
h(Y nFj )− h(Y
n
Fj |M,X
n
1,B)
}
(54)
= n {|G| · |F| · log2 P +Θ(1)} , (55)
where the last step uses the fact that
h(Y nFj ) ≤
∑
k∈Fj
h(Y nk ) ≤ n{|F| log2 P +O(1)}, (56)
and
h(Y nFj |M,X
n
1,B) = h(Y
n
Fj |X
n
1,Fj , X
n
2,Fj) = n · O(1). (57)
Dividing each side of (55) by log2 P and taking the limit
P →∞ yields (47).
Proof of Lemma 3: We use induction over the variable
i to establish (52). For i = 0, note that c0 = 0 and V1 = G
and hence (52) is simply (49). This completes the proof for
the base case.
For the induction step, we assume that (52) holds for some
t = i, we need to show that (52) also holds for t = i+1, i.e.,
(i+ 1) · n(Rs,1 − δn) + ci+1 · n(Rs,2 − δn) ≤
i+1∑
j=1
I(M,Xn1,B;Y
n
Fj ) + I(M,X
n
1,B\G ;Y
n
Vi+1) (58)
holds. For our proof we separately consider the cases when
|F| ≤ |Vi| and when |Vi| < |F| holds.
When |F| ≤ |Vi|, from Definition 1
Fi+1 ⊆ Vi, Vi+1 = Vi\Fi+1, ci+1 = ci (59)
holds. Then (58) follows by combining (52) with (48) as we
show below. Note that
I(M,Xn1,B\G ;Y
n
Vi) = I(M,X
n
1,B\G ;Y
n
Fi+1 |Y
n
Vi\Fi+1
)
+ I(M,Xn1,B\G ;Y
n
Vi+1) (60)
≤ I(M,Xn1,B\G , Y
n
Vi\Fi+1
;Y nFi+1) + I(M,X
n
1,B\G ;Y
n
Vi+1)
(61)
≤ I(M,Xn1,B\G , X
n
1,Vi\Fi+1
;Y nFi+1) + I(M,X
n
1,B\G ;Y
n
Vi+1)
(62)
≤ I(M,Xn1,B\G , X
n
1,G\Fi+1
;Y nFi+1) + I(M,X
n
1,B\G ;Y
n
Vi+1)
(63)
= I(M,Xn1,B\Fi+1 ;Y
n
Fi+1) + I(M,X
n
1,B\G ;Y
n
Vi+1) (64)
where (60) follows from the chain rule of the mutual infor-
mation and the definition of Vi+1 in (59), while (62) follows
from the Markov condition
Y nVi\Fi+1 ↔ (X
n
1,Vi\Fi+1
, Xn2,Vi\Fi+1)↔ (M,Y
n
Fi+1 , X
n
1,B\G)
(65)
and the fact that M = (Xn2,B∪C , Y n1,A) already includes
Xn2,Vi\Fi+1 , (63) follows from the fact that Vi ⊆ G, while (64)
follows from the fact that {B\G} ∪ {G\Fi+1} = {B\Fi+1}.
Substituting (64) into the last term in (52) we get
i · n(Rs,1 − δn) + ci · n(Rs,2 − δn)
≤
i∑
j=1
I(M,Xn1,B;Y
n
Fj ) + I(M,X
n
1,B\G ;Y
n
Vi)
≤
i∑
j=1
I(M,Xn1,B;Y
n
Fj ) + I(M,X
n
1,B\Fi+1
;Y nFi+1)
+ I(M,Xn1,B\G ;Y
n
Vi+1). (66)
Finally combining (66) with (48) and using ci+1 = ci
(c.f. (59)) we have
(i+ 1) · n(Rs,1 − δn) + ci+1 · n(Rs,2 − δn)
≤
i∑
j=1
I(M,Xn1,B;Y
n
Fj ) + I(M,X
n
1,B\Fi+1
;Y nFi+1)
+ I(M,Xn1,B\G ;Y
n
Vi+1)
+ I(Xn1,Fi+1;Y
n
Fi+1 |M,X
n
1,B\Fi+1
) (67)
=
i+1∑
j=1
I(M,Xn1,B;Y
n
Fj ) + I(M,X
n
1,B\G ;Y
n
Vi+1) (68)
as required.
When |F| > |Vi|, as stated in Definition 1 we introduce
Hi+1 = {1, 2, . . . , |F| − |Vi|} and recall that
Fi+1 = Vi ∪Hi+1, Vi+1 = G\Hi+1, ci+1 = ci + 1
(69)
7holds. From (49) and (58) we have that
i · n(Rs,1 − δn) + (ci + 1) · n(Rs,2 − δn)
=
i∑
j=1
I(M,Xn1,B;Y
n
Fj) + I(M,X
n
1,B\G ;Y
n
Vi)
+ I(M,Xn1,B\G ;Y
n
G ) (70)
=
i∑
j=1
I(M,Xn1,B;Y
n
Fj) + I(M,X
n
1,B\G ;Y
n
Vi)
+ I(M,Xn1,B\G ;Y
n
Hi+1 |Y
n
G\Hi+1
) + I(M,Xn1,B\G ;Y
n
Vi+1)
(71)
As we will show subsequently,
I(M,Xn1,B\G ;Y
n
Vi) + I(M,X
n
1,B\G ;Y
n
Hi+1 |Y
n
G\Hi+1
)
≤ I(M,Xn1,B\Fi+1;Y
n
Fi+1). (72)
Combining (48), (71) and (72) and using ci+1 = ci + 1 we
get that
(i+ 1) · n(Rs,1 − δn) + ci+1 · n(Rs,2 − δn)
≤
i∑
j=1
I(M,Xn1,B;Y
n
Fj) + I(M,X
n
1,B\G ;Y
n
Vi+1)
+ I(M,Xn1,B\Fi+1 ;Y
n
Fi+1) + I(X
n
Fi+1 ;Y
n
Fi+1 |M,X
n
1,B\Fi+1
)
(73)
=
i∑
j=1
I(M,Xn1,B;Y
n
Fj) + I(M,X
n
1,B\G ;Y
n
Vi+1)
+ I(M,Xn1,B;Y
n
Fi+1), (74)
which establishes (58).
It only remains to establish (72) which we do now. First,
since Fi+1 ⊆ G it follows that {B\G} ⊆ {B\Fi+1} and hence
we bound the first term in the left hand side of (72) as
I(M,Xn1,B\G ;Y
n
Vi) ≤ I(M,X
n
1,B\Fi+1
;Y nVi). (75)
Next, since the set Hi+1 = {1, . . . , |F|− |Vi|} constitutes the
first |F|−|Vi| elements of G and Vi = {|G|−|Vi|+1, . . . , |G|}
constitutes the last |Vi| elements of G and |F| ≤ |G| we have
that
{G\Hi+1} = {|F| − |Vi|+ 1, . . . , |G|}
= {|F| − |Vi|+ 1, . . . , |G| − |Vi|} ∪ {|G| − |Vi|+ 1, . . . , |G|}
= {G\(Hi+1 ∪ Vi)} ∪ Vi
= {G\Fi+1} ∪ Vi (76)
where the last relation follows from the definition of Fi+1
(c.f. (69)). Using (76) we can bound the second term in (72)
as follows.
I(M,Xn1,B\G ;Y
n
Hi+1 |Y
n
G\Hi+1
)
= I(M,Xn1,B\G ;Y
n
Hi+1 |Y
n
G\Fi+1
, Y nVi) (77)
≤ I(M,Xn1,B\G , Y
n
G\Fi+1
;Y nHi+1 |Y
n
Vi) (78)
≤ I(M,Xn1,B\G , X
n
1,G\Fi+1
;Y nHi+1 |Y
n
Vi) (79)
≤ I(M,Xn1,B\Fi+1 ;Y
n
Hi+1 |Y
n
Vi), (80)
where in (79), we use the Markov relation
Y nG\Fi+1 ↔ (X
n
1,G\Fi+1
, Xn2,G\Fi+1)↔ (M,X
n
1,B\G , Y
n
Fi+1)
(81)
and the fact that M = (Xn2,B∪C , Y n1,A) already contains
Xn2,G\Fi+1 . Combining (75) and (80) gives
I(M,Xn1,B\G ;Y
n
Vi) + I(M,X
n
1,B\G ;Y
n
Hi+1 |Y
n
G\Hi+1
)
≤ I(M,Xn1,B\Fi+1 ;Y
n
Fi+1), (82)
thus establishing (72).
This completes the proof.
D. Converse: min(|A|, |C|) ≤ NE ≤ max(|A|, |C|)
We assume without loss of generality that |C| ≥ |A| and as
before let Ek be the set of links such that an eavesdropper is
monitoring for message Wk. Since |E1| = |E2| = NE and
|A| ≤ NE ≤ |C| holds, we select the sets such that the
relations A ⊆ E1 ⊆ A ∪ B and C ⊇ E2 are both satisfied.
Define F = B\E1 and note that |F| = |A|+ |B| −NE .
Theorem 1 reduces to the following region :
0 ≤ d1 ≤ |F| (83)
0 ≤ d2 ≤ |B|+ |C| −NE (84)
|B|d1 + |F|d2 ≤ (|B|+ |C| −NE)× |F | (85)
Since (83) and (84) directly follow from the single user
case [17], we only need to establish (85). As in earlier cases
we begin by establishing the following bounds on the rate pair
(Rs,1, Rs,2):
n(Rs,1 − δn) ≤ I(X
n
1,F ;Y
n
F |M,X
n
1,B\F) (86)
n(Rs,2 − δn) ≤ I (M ;Y
n
B ) + I
(
Xn2,C\E2 ;Y
n
C\E2
)
(87)
where M =
(
Xn2,B∪C , Y
n
1,A
)
.
Proof: The proof for (86) is identical to (48) in Lemma 2
since the proof does not depend on the choice of E2. The proof
for (87) is identical to (42) in Lemma 1.
To establish (83)-(85), note that by defining
R′s,2 = Rs,2 −
1
n
I
(
Xn2,C\E2 ;Y
n
C\E2
)
, (88)
we have from (87) that
n(R′s,2 − δn) ≤ I (M ;Y
n
B ) (89)
and the bounds on Rs,1 and R′s,2 in (86) and (89) are
identical to the bounds (48) and (49) in Lemma 2 with
G = B. Applying Lemma 3 to Rs,1 and R′s,2 for each
i = 0, 1, · · · , |G|, it follows that
i · n(Rs,1 − δn) + ci · n(R
′
s,2 − δn)
≤
i∑
j=1
I(M,Xn1,B;Y
n
Fj ) + I(M,Y
n
Vi). (90)
where the sets Vi, Fi and the sequence ci are as in Definition 1.
Substituting (89) into (90) and evaluating the bound for i = |B|
8we have that
|B|n(Rs,1− δn)+ |F|n(Rs,2− δn) ≤ |F|I(X
n
2,C\E2
;Y nC\E2)
+
|B|∑
j=1
I(M,Xn1,B;Y
n
Fj). (91)
Finally substituting
d
(
1
n
I(M,Xn2,C\E2 ;Y
n
C\E2
)
≤ |C| −NE (92)
d
(
1
n
I(M,Xn1,B;Y
n
Fj)
)
≤ |F|, (93)
in (91) we obtain (85).
VI. GENERAL MIMO-MAC
The result for the general MIMO case (1) follows by a
transformation that reduces the model to the case of parallel
independent channels in the previous section while preserving
the secrecy degrees of freedom region. As we discuss next, this
transformation involves the generalized singular value decom-
position (GSVD) [28] and a channel enhancement argument.
For an analogous application of GSVD to broadcast channels
see e.g., [18], [29], [30].
A. GSVD Transformation
Theorem 2: [28] Given a pair of matrices H1 and H2
such that the rank of Hi is ri, i = 1, 2, and the rank of
[ H1 | H2 ] is r0, there exists unitary matrices U1,U2,W,Q
and nonsingular upper triangular matrix R such that for
s = r1 + r2 − r0, r˜1 = r1 − s, r˜2 = r2 − s,
UH1 H
H
1 Q = Σ1(NT1×r0)
[
WHR(r0×r0),0
]
(r0×NR)
(94)
UH2 H
H
2 Q = Σ2(NT2×r0)
[
WHR(r0×r0),0
]
(r0×NR)
(95)
Σ1 =

 I1(r˜1×r˜1) S1(s×s)
O1((NT1−r˜1−s)×r˜2)

 (96)
Σ2 =

 O2((NT2−r˜2−s)×r˜1) S2(s×s)
I2(r˜2×r˜2)

 (97)
where Ii, i = 1, 2 are r˜i × r˜i identity matrices, Oi, i = 1, 2
are zero matrices, and Si, i = 1, 2 are s× s diagonal matrices
with positive real elements on the diagonal line that satisfy
S21+S
2
2 = Is, and r˜1+s+r˜2 = r0. For clarity, the dimension of
each matrix is shown in the parenthesis in the subscript. I1 has
the same number of columns as O2. I2 has the same number
of columns O1. However, Oi, i = 1, 2 are not necessarily
square matrices and can be empty, i.e., having zero number of
rows.
For convenience in notation we define A = WHR and
observe that A is a square and non-singular matrix. Then from
Theorem 2, we have:
QHHtUt =
[
AH
0
]
ΣHt , t = 1, 2. (98)
Without loss of generality, we can cancel Q and Ut and
rewrite (1) as:
Y =
[
AHr0×r0
0(NR−r0)×r0
]
NR×r0
ΣH1 X1
+
[
AHr0×r0
0(NR−r0)×r0
]
NR×r0
ΣH2 X2 + Z. (99)
Since Q and Ut are unitary matrices, the components of Z
are independent from each other and the power constraints of
each transmitter remains the same as P¯i, i = 1, 2. Because the
components of Z are independent, the intended receiver can
discard the last NR − r0 components in Y without affecting
the secrecy capacity region of this channel. This means that
we only need to consider the case where NR = r0 and rewrite
(1) as:
Y = AHr0×r0(Σ
H
1 X1 +Σ
H
2 X2) + Z. (100)
B. Converse
For establishing the converse, we further enhance the chan-
nel model in (100) to the following
Y = ΣH1 X1 +Σ
H
2 X2 + σ+Z
′ (101)
where σ+ ≤ 1 is any sufficiently small constant such that, σ2+
times the maximal eigenvalue of AHr0×r0Ar0×r0 , is smaller
than 1 and Z′ is a circularly symmetric unit-variance Gaussian
noise vector.
To establish (101), note that we can express
Z = σ+ ·A
HZ′ + Z′′ (102)
where Z′′ is a Gaussian random vector, independent of Z′ and
with a covariance matrix
Ir0×r0 − σ
2
+A
H
r0×r0Ar0×r0 (103)
which is guaranteed to be positive semi-definite by our choice
of σ+. Upon substituting (102) into (100), we have
Y = AHr0×r0
(
ΣH1 X1 +Σ
H
2 X2 + σ+Z
′
)
+ Z′′. (104)
We consider an enhanced receiver that is revealed Z′′. Clearly
this additional knowledge can only increase the rate and serves
as an upper bound. It is also clear that since Z′′ is independent
of (X1,X2,Z′), it suffices to use this information to cancel
Z′′ in (104) and then discard it. Furthermore since the matrix
A is invertible, upon canceling it, we obtain (101).
We further enhance the receiver by replacing ΣH1 and ΣH2
with Σ¯H1 and Σ¯H2 so that the model reduces to
Y = Σ¯H1 X1 + Σ¯
H
2 X2 + σ+Z
′ (105)
where
Σ¯H1 =

 Ir˜1×r˜1 I1(s×s)
01(r˜2×(NT1−r1))


r0×NT1(106)
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
 02(r˜1×(NT2−r2)) I2(s×s)
I2(r˜2×r˜2)


r0×NT2
(107)
are obtained by replacing each diagonal Si by the identity
matrix. The model (105) can only have a higher capacity, since
each diagonal entry in Si is between (0, 1). We observe that
in the resulting channel model is identical to (22)-(24)
|A| = r0 − r2 (108)
|B| = s = r1 + r2 − r0 (109)
|C| = r0 − r1 (110)
except that the noise variance is reduced by a factor of σ2+.
Since a fixed scaling in the noise power does not affect the
secure-degrees of freedom, an outer bound on the s.d.o.f. for
the parallel channel model (22)-(24) with A, B and C defined
via (105), continues to be an outer bound on the s.d.o.f. region
for the general MIMO-MAC channel.
Substituting (108)-(110) in the upper bounds in section V-B,
V-C and V-D we establish the converse in Theorem 1.
C. Achievability
To establish the achievability for the general MIMO case
we further use a suitable degradation mechanism to reduce
the model (100) to
Y = ΣH1 X1 +Σ
H
2 X2 + σZ
′′ (111)
where σ ≥ 1 is any sufficiently large constant such that, σ2
times the minimum eigenvalue of AHr0×r0Ar0×r0 , is greater
than 1 and Z′′ is a circularly symmetric unit-variance Gaussian
noise vector. Since A is non-singular we are guaranteed that
all the singular values of A are non-zero and hence a σ <∞
exists.
To establish (111), let Z′ be a Gaussian noise vector with
covariance
σ2AHr0×r0Ar0×r0 − Ir0×r0 (112)
independent of Z and consider a degraded version of (100)
Y = AHr0×r0
(
ΣH1 X1 +Σ
H
2 X2
)
+ Z+ Z′ (113)
which can be simulated at the receiver by adding additional
noise Z′ to its output. Since Z + Z′ ∼ CN (0, σ2AHA), we
can express Z + Z′ = σAHZ′′. Substituting into (113) and
canceling the non-singular matrix A, we arrive at (111).
Let s¯ > 0 denote the minimum element on the diagonals
of S1 and S2 in (96) and (97) respectively. By appropriately
scaling down the transmit powers on each of the sub-channels
we can further reduce (104) to
Y = Σ¯H1 X1 + Σ¯
H
2 X2 +
σ
s¯
Z′′ (114)
where Σ¯k are defined in (96) and (97) respectively. The
model (114) is identical to the parallel channel model (22)-
(24) with the size of sets A, B and C in (108)-(110) and with a
noise power that is larger by a factor of σ2/s¯2. Since a constant
factor in the noise power does not affect the secrecy degrees
of freedom, the coding schemes described in section V-A
achieves the lower bound in Theorem 1.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work we have studied the two-transmitter Gaussian
complex MIMO-MAC wiretap channel where the eavesdrop-
per channel is arbitrarily varying and its state is known to
the eavesdropper only, and the main channel is static and its
state is known to all nodes. We have completely characterized
the s.d.o.f. region for this channel for all possible antenna
configurations. We have proved that this s.d.o.f. region can be
achieved by a scheme that orthogonalizes the transmit signals
of the two users at the intended receiver, in which each user
achieves secrecy guarantee independently without cooperation
from the other user. The converse was proved by carefully
changing the set of signals available to the eavesdropper
through an induction procedure in order to obtain an upper
bound on a weighted-sum-rate expression.
As suggested by this work, the optimal strategy for a
communication network where the eavesdropper channel is
arbitrarily varying can potentially be very different from the
case where the eavesdropper channel is fixed and its state is
known to all terminals. This is also observed for example in the
MIMO broadcast channel [18] and the two-way channel [31],
[32]. Characterizing secure transmission limits for a broader
class of communication models with this assumption is hence
important and is left as future work.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
For Rs,1, from Fano’s inequality, we have
n(Rs,1 − δn) ≤ I(W1;Y
n
A∪B∪C)− I(W1;Y
n
E1) (115)
≤ I
(
W1;Y
n
A∪B∪C |Y
n
E1
) (116)
≤ I
(
W1;Y
n
A∪B∪C , X
n
2,B∪C|Y
n
E1
) (117)
= I
(
W1;Y
n
A∪B, X
n
2,B∪C |Y
n
E1
) (118)
where the last step (118) relies on the fact that the additive
noise at each receiver end of each sub-channel in Figure 5 is
independent from each other and hence
Y nC → X
n
2,C → (W1, Y
n
A∪B, Y
n
E1 , X
n
2,B)
holds. Since
(
Xn2,C, X
n
2,B
)
is independent from W1, and E1 ⊆
A, (118) can be written as:
I
(
W1;Y
n
A∪B|Y
n
E1 , X
n
2,B∪C
)
=I
(
W1;Y
n
(A\E1)∪B
|Y nE1 , X
n
2,B∪C
)
(119)
=I
(
W1;Y
n
A\E1
|Y nE1 , X
n
2,B∪C
)
+ I
(
W1;Y
n
B |Y
n
A , X
n
2,B∪C
)
(120)
where the last step (120) follows from the fact E1 ⊆ A and
hence A = (A\E1)∪E1. We separately bound each of the two
terms above.
I
(
W1;Y
n
A\E1
|Y nE1 , X
n
2,B∪C
)
≤ I
(
W1, Y
n
E1 , X
n
2,B∪C ;Y
n
A\E1
)
(121)
≤ I
(
W1, Y
n
E1 , X
n
2,B∪C , X
n
1,A\E1
;Y nA\E1
)
(122)
= I
(
Xn1,A\E1 ;Y
n
A\E1
)
(123)
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where the last step follows from the Markov chain relation
Y n1,A\E1 ↔ X
n
A\E1
↔ (W1, Y nE1 , X
n
2,B∪C), We upper bound
the second term in (120) as follows
I
(
W1;Y
n
B |Y
n
A , X
n
2,B∪C
)
≤ I
(
Xn1,A∪B;Y
n
B |Y
n
A , X
n
2,B∪C
) (124)
= I
(
Xn1,B;Y
n
B |Y
n
A , X
n
2,B∪C
)
+ I
(
Xn1,A;Y
n
B |Y
n
A , X
n
2,B∪C , X
n
1,B
) (125)
= I
(
Xn1,B;Y
n
B |Y
n
A , X
n
2,B∪C
) (126)
where we use the Markov relation W1 ↔ Xn1,A∪B ↔
(Y nA , X
n
2,B∪C) in step (124) and (126) follows from the fact
Markov relation
Y nB ↔ (X
n
1,B, X
n
2,B)↔ (X
n
2,C , Y
n
A ). (127)
Note that (41) follows upon substituting (123) and (126)
into (120).
For Rs,2, from Fano’s inequality and the secrecy constraint,
we have:
n(Rs,2 − δn) ≤ I(W2;Y
n
A∪B∪C)− I(W2;X
n
2,E2) (128)
≤I
(
W2;Y
n
A∪B∪C |X
n
2,E2
) (129)
=I
(
W2;Y
n
B∪C |Y
n
A , X
n
2,E2
) (130)
=I
(
W2;Y
n
(C\E2)∪B
|Y nA , X
n
2,E2
)
(131)
=I
(
W2;Y
n
C\E2
|Y nA , X
n
2,E2
)
+ I
(
W2;Y
n
B |Y
n
A , X
n
2,E2 , Y
n
C\E2
)
(132)
where (130) follows from the fact that Y nA is independent of
(W2, X
n
2,B∪C) and (131) follows from the fact that Y nE2 →
Xn2,E2 → (Y
n
B∪C\E2
,W2, Y
n
A ) holds. We separately bound each
term in (132).
I
(
W2;Y
n
C\E2
|Y nA , X
n
2,E2
)
≤ I
(
W2, Y
n
A , X
n
2,E2 ;Y
n
C\E2
)
(133)
≤ I
(
Xn2,C\E2 ,W2, Y
n
A , X
n
2,E2 ;Y
n
C\E2
)
(134)
= I
(
Xn2,C\E2 ;Y
n
C\E2
)
, (135)
where the justification for establishing (135) is identical
to (123) and hence omitted. We finally bound the second term
in (132).
I
(
W2;Y
n
B |Y
n
A , X
n
2,E2, Y
n
C\E2
)
(136)
≤I
(
Xn2,B∪C ;Y
n
B |Y
n
A , X
n
2,E2, Y
n
C\E2
)
(137)
≤I
(
Y nA , X
n
2,B∪C , X
n
2,E2 , Y
n
C\E2
;Y nB
)
(138)
=I
(
Y nA , X
n
2,B∪C, X
n
2,E2 ;Y
n
B
)
+ I
(
Y nC\E2 ;Y
n
B |Y
n
A , X
n
2,B∪C, X
n
2,E2
)
(139)
=I
(
Y nA , X
n
2,B∪C;Y
n
B
) (140)
where the justification for arriving at (140) is similar to (126)
and hence omitted.
Substituting (135) and (140) into (132) we establish (42).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Assume the eavesdropper monitors Y nA and Xn1,E1\A for W1.
Then for Rs,1, from Fano’s inequality, we have:
n(Rs,1 − δn)
≤I (W1;Y
n
A∪B∪C)− I
(
W1;Y
n
A , X
n
1,E1\A
)
(141)
≤I
(
W1;Y
n
A∪B∪C |Y
n
A , X
n
1,E1\A
)
(142)
=I
(
W1;Y
n
B∪C |Y
n
A , X
n
1,E1\A
)
(143)
≤I
(
W1;Y
n
B∪C , X
n
2,B∪C|Y
n
A , X
n
1,E1\A
)
(144)
=I
(
W1;Y
n
B∪C |Y
n
A , X
n
1,E1\A
, Xn2,B∪C
)
(145)
=I
(
W1;Y
n
F |Y
n
A , X
n
1,E1\A
, Xn2,B∪C
)
(146)
=I
(
W1;Y
n
F |Y
n
A , X
n
1,B\F , X
n
2,B∪C
)
(147)
where (145) follows from the fact that Xn2,B∪C is independent
of (W1, Y nA , Xn1,E1\A). while (146) follows from the fact that
since the noise across the channels is independent the Markov
condition
(Y nE1\A, Y
n
C )↔ (X
n
1,E1\A
, Xn2,B∪C)↔ (W1, Y
n
B\E1
, Y nA )
holds and furthermore we have defined F = B\E1.
Since the channel noise is independent of the message,
W1 ↔ Xn1,A∪B ↔ (Y
n
F∪A, X
n
1,B\F , X
n
2,B∪C) holds. Hence
I
(
W1;Y
n
F |Y
n
A , X
n
1,B\F , X
n
2,B∪C
)
(148)
≤I
(
Xn1,A∪B;Y
n
F |Y
n
A , X
n
1,B\F , X
n
2,B∪C
)
(149)
=I
(
Xn1,F ;Y
n
F |Y
n
A , X
n
1,B\F , X
n
2,B∪C
)
+ I
(
Xn1,A∪B\F ;Y
n
F |Y
n
A , X
n
1,B, X
n
2,B∪C
)
(150)
=I
(
Xn1,F ;Y
n
F |Y
n
A , X
n
1,B\F , X
n
2,B∪C
)
(151)
where the last step uses the fact that the second term in (150)
involves conditioning on (Xn1,F , Xn2,F) and hence is zero. This
establishes (48).
For Rs,2, we assume the eavesdropper is monitoring
Xn2,C, X
n
2,E2\C
for W2. Using Fano’s inequality and the secrecy
constraint, we have:
n(Rs,2 − δn) ≤ I (W2;Y
n
A∪B∪C)− I
(
W2;X
n
2,E2
) (152)
≤I
(
W2;Y
n
A∪B∪C |X
n
2,E2
) (153)
≤I
(
W2;Y
n
A∪B∪C , X
n
1,E2∩B|X
n
2,E2
) (154)
=I
(
W2;Y
n
B∪C |X
n
2,E2 , Y
n
A , X
n
1,E2∩B
) (155)
≤I
(
Xn2,B∪C ;Y
n
B∪C |X
n
2,E2 , Y
n
A , X
n
1,E2∩B
) (156)
=I
(
Xn2,B∪C ;Y
n
G∪E2 |X
n
2,E2 , Y
n
A , X
n
1,E2∩B
) (157)
=I
(
Xn2,B∪C ;Y
n
G |X
n
2,E2 , Y
n
A , X
n
1,E2∩B
)
+ I
(
Xn2,B∪C;Y
n
E2 |X
n
2,E2 , Y
n
A∪G , X
n
1,E2∩B
) (158)
=I
(
Xn2,B∪C ;Y
n
G |X
n
2,E2 , Y
n
A , X
n
1,E2∩B
) (159)
≤ I
(
Xn2,B∪C , Y
n
A , X
n
1,E2∩B;Y
n
G
) (160)
11
≤I
(
M,Xn1,B\G ;Y
n
G
)
(161)
where (155) follows from the fact that (Xn1,E2∩B, Y nA ) are
the transmitted signals from user 1 and independent of
(W2, X
n
2,E2
) and (157) follows from the fact that C ⊆ E2 ⊆
B∪C and G = B\E2 and hence E2∪G = B∪C holds. Eq. (159)
follows from the fact that since the noise on each channel is
Markov, we have Y nE2 ↔ (X
n
2,E2
, Xn1,E2∩B) ↔ (Y
n
A∪G , X
n
B∪C)
and hence the second term in (158) is zero.
Hence we have proved Lemma 2.
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